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On May 23, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the federally-mandated beef promotion program against a First Amendment challenge 
on the basis that the program constituted government 
speech. The Court, however, left open the possibility 
that the beef check-off could be successfully challenged 
on First Amendment grounds if it can be shown on re-
mand that the advertisements attribute their generic pro-
beef message to the plaintiffs. As such, the Court’s ruling 
does not necessarily end the beef check-off litigation, 
and is not entirely precedential for the pork check-off 
litigation that awaits a determination as to whether the 
Supreme Court will hear the case.
The statutory framework
The Beef Promotion and Research Act (Act) was passed 
by the Congress as part of the Food Security Act of 
1985. Under the statute, the Secretary of Agriculture 
(Secretary) was directed to issue a Beef Promotion and 
Research Order (Order). The Act also directed the 
Secretary to appoint a Cattlemen’s Beef Promotion and 
Research Board (Board) which convened an Operating 
Committee (Committee) and imposed a $1 per-head 
assessment (the “check-off”) on all sales or importation 
of cattle, which is to be used to fund beef related proj-
ects, including promotional campaigns designed by the 
Committee and approved by the Secretary. 
It is clear from the legislative history of the Act that the 
program was only intended as enabling legislation to 
establish an industry “self-help” program.
The government speech issue
The case involved (in the majority’s view) a narrow 
facial attack on whether the statutory language of 
the Act created an advertising program that could be 
classiﬁ ed as government speech. That was the only 
issue before the Court. While the government speech 
doctrine is relatively new and is not well-developed, 
prior Supreme Court opinions not involving agricul-
tural commodity check-offs indicated that to consti-
tute government speech, a checkoff must clear three 
hurdles - (1) the government must exercise sufﬁ cient 
control over the content of the check-off to be deemed 
ultimately responsible for the message; (2) the source 
of the check-off assessments must come from a large, 
non-discrete group; and (3) the central purpose of 
the check-off must be identiﬁ ed as the government’s. 
Based on that analysis, it was believed that the beef 
check-off would clear only the ﬁ rst and (perhaps) the 
third hurdle, but that the program would fail to clear 
the second hurdle. Indeed, the source of funding for 
the beef check-off comes from a discrete identiﬁ able 
source (cattle producers) rather than a large, non-dis-
crete group. The point is that if the government can 
compel a targeted group of individuals to fund speech 
with which they do not agree, greater care is required 
to ensure political accountability as a democratic check 
against the compelled speech. That is less of a concern 
if the funding source is the taxpaying public which has 
access to the ballot box as a means of neutralizing the 
government program at issue and/or the politicians in 
support of the program. While the dissent focused on 
this point, arguing that the Act does not establish suf-
ﬁ cient democratic checks, Justice Scalia, writing for the 
majority, opined that the compelled-subsidy analysis is 
unaffected by whether the funds for the promotions are 
raised by general taxes or through a targeted assess-
ment. That effectively eliminates the second prong of 
the government speech test. The Court held that the 
other two requirements were satisﬁ ed inasmuch as the 
Act vests substantial control over the administration of 
the check-off and the content of the ads in the Secre-
tary.
Unresolved issue
The court did not address (indeed, the issue was not 
before the court) whether the advertisements, most of 
which are credited to “America’s Beef Producers,” give 
the impression that the objecting cattlemen (or their 
organizations) endorse the message. Because the case 
only involved a facial challenge to the statutory lan-
guage of the Act, the majority examined only the Act’s 
language and concluded that neither the statute nor the 
accompanying Order required attribution of the ads 
to “America’s Beef Producers” or to anyone else. Thus, 
neither the statute nor the Order could be facially 
invalid on this theory. However, the Court noted that 
the record did not contain evidence from which the 
Court could determine whether the actual application 
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of the check-off program resulted in the message of the 
ads being associated with the plaintiffs. Indeed, Justice 
Thomas, in his concurring opinion, noted that the gov-
ernment may not associate individuals or organizations 
involuntarily with speech by attributing an unwanted 
message to them whether or not those individuals fund 
the speech and whether or not the message is under 
the government’s control. Justice Thomas speciﬁ cally 
noted that, on remand, the plaintiffs may be able to 
amend their complaint to assert an attribution claim 
which ultimately could result in the beef check-off be-
ing held unconstitutional. If those facts are developed 
on remand, and the ads are found to be attributable to 
the complaining ranchers or their associated groups, 
the beef check-off could still be held to be unconstitu-
tional.
Implications of the decision
It seems clear from the opinion that the Secretary now 
must take steps to afﬁ rmatively exercise the author-
ity vested in the Secretary under the Act, and run the 
check-off as the government program the Court says 
it is. Likewise, organizations that purport to speak 
for ranchers must actually represent them – failure to 
do so, coupled with receipt of check-off dollars (or 
indirect beneﬁ t from check-off dollars), will bolster a 
constitutional claim by members of non-check-off re-
cipient cattle organizations (who must pay the assess-
ment) on freedom of association grounds.
The opinion also is not entirely precedential for the 
pending pork check-off litigation. That case involves 
not only a government speech issue, but also a free-
dom of association claim. Thus, the pork case contains 
a remaining open claim on the compelled association 
issue.
The opinion may prove ultimately to not be that useful 
of a precedent on the government speech issue. Only 
four of the six justices that formed the majority in the 
case really believe that the beef ads constitute govern-
ment speech. Justice Ginsburg concurred separately 
and stated that while she did not believe the beef ads 
amounted to government speech, the majority reached 
an adequate decision for the wrong reason. Justice 
Breyer also concurred separately and stated his contin-
ued belief that the beef check-off is a permissible form 
of economic regulation, but that the majority’s govern-
ment speech theory was an acceptable solution. 
In any event, the majority opinion would appear to 
expand the application of the government speech doc-
trine. Apparently it is no longer the rule that permissible 
compelled public support for speech is limited to situ-
ations where the government does not exercise control 
over the speech and takes a viewpoint-neutral approach 
that lets private parties determine the content of the 
speech being supported.
What remains clear is that check-off funds cannot be 
used to promote the check-off itself.
What’s next?
The Court remanded the case to the Federal District 
Court in South Dakota. The Livestock Marketing Asso-
ciation will have to decide whether it will continue the 
litigation on the ad attribution rationale suggested by 
Justice Thomas. Beyond that, it is difﬁ cult to determine 
why the Court seemingly expanded the government 
speech doctrine. Clearly, Justices Scalia, Thomas and 
Rehnquist (all part of the majority) are sympathetic to 
the government speech analysis in the context of abor-
tion, and they may have ruled as they did in the beef 
case to expand the government speech doctrine for ap-
plication in a case they will decide next term involving 
a federal law (known as the Solomon Amendment) that 
removes federal funds from institutions of higher educa-
tion that do not permit military recruiters on campus. 
That case has been positioned as a government speech 
case (among other claims), and in late 2004 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that 
the Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional because 
it forced schools to agree with the government’s policy 
of allowing gays to serve in the military only if they do 
not openly declare their sexual orientation.
* Reprinted with permission from the June 3, 2005 issue of 
Agricultural Law Digest, Agricultural Law Press Publications, 
Eugene, Oregon. Footnotes not included.
